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сам борьбы с терроризмом государствами-участниками СНГ. 
В ходе проведения подобных мероприятий приобретается прак-
тический опыт взаимодействия правоохранительных органов, спец-
служб и воинских подразделений в ведении борьбы с террори-
стическими формированиями.
Третьей стратегической задачей является модернизация оборонно-
промышленного комплекса в интересах укрепления военной без-
опасности государства.
Актуальность этой задачи обусловлена технологическим отста-
ванием Казахстана не только от ведущих государств мира, но и 
ряда стран СНГ в разработке и создании вооружений, военной и 
специальной техники. 
Кроме того, опасным для национальной безопасности явля-
ется снижение укомплектованности Вооруженных Сил, других 
войск и воинских формирований современными видами воору-
жения, военной и специальной техники. Это непосредственно ска-
зывается на уровне их боевых возможностей. 
Для наращивания возможностей отечественных предприятий в 
производстве вооружения, военной и специальной техники, дру-
гих материальных средств необходимы структурная перестройка 
и совершенствование научно-технической, экспериментальной и 
производственной базы предприятий и организаций, выпускаю-
щих продукцию и оказывающих услуги военного назначения. 
Для создания в нашей стране новых высокотехнологичных про-
изводств необходимы межзаводская кооперация, расширение 
производственных и научно-технических связей с государства-
ми ближнего и дальнего зарубежья, создание совместных произ-
водств с сохранением государственного участия, развитие кадро-
вого потенциала предприятий с целью расширения их возмож-
ностей по ремонту, модернизации и выпуску новых видов воору-
жений и военной техники для Вооруженных Сил, других войск и 
воинских формирований.4
Концепция вхождения Казахстана в число 30 самых развитых 
стран предусматривает выстраивание адекватной новым вызо-
вам международной и оборонной политики, что, в свою очередь, 
требует консолидации усилий государственных органов, концен-
трации сил, средств и выделяемых ресурсов на приоритетных на-
правлениях обеспечения военной безопасности Казахстана, а так-
же их рационального использования. Это обусловлено всеобъем-
лющим и комплексным характером вызовов и угроз международ-
ной и национальной безопасности в современных условиях.
4См. Дубовцев Г. Военно-техническая политика как важный фактор укрепле-
ния национальной безопасности государства // Военно-теоретический жур-
нал «Бағдар– Ориентир»,  № 3, 2012 г. С. 8-13.
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1. The development of constitutional control mechanisms is strictly 
linked with the birth of the modern constitutional State: drafting of 
Fundamental Charters and establishing of the Rule of Law represented 
the prerequisites for constitutional control. There is no doubt that the 
judicial review took place when constitutional Charters became the 
fundamental document of the modern States, building up political 
and social organizations according the principles of democracy and 
human dignity. 
The establishment of institutions with the competence of constitutional 
review is nowadays considered a standard component of a democracy. It 
is increasingly common to entrust the power of constitutional review to 
a specialised constitutional court that can issue authoritative decisions 
on the constitutionality of laws and on Government’s actions and 
interpret the Constitution’s provisions. 
Furthermore, a constitutional Court can play many important roles, 
always related with the fundamental power of ensuring the respect 
of the highest State principles and values. Its jurisdiction could aim at 
protecting individual rights; at providing a forum for the resolution of 
disputes in federal systems, and also in regionalised and in decentralised 
systems; at ensuring and enforcing the separation of powers through 
decisions about the conflicts between State organs; at suing the Head of 
the State or the Government for high treason to the Nation; at certifying 
election results and the admissibility of referendum; at assessing the 
legality of political parties.
In order to achieve the best functioning of judicial review, different 
States, in relation with their social, political and economic situation, 
have adopted various mechanisms of constitutional justice. The specific 
historical, political and social events, that marked the building of National 
States (not only European), have contributed to define the different 
features of constitutional control mechanisms.
First of all, policy makers had to choose between the two main 
constitutional control models: centralised system – or the European 
one, since it was introduced in Austria after the First World War and 
then followed by other European Countries after Second World War – 
and diffuse method of control, firstly adopted in the United States. 
In fact, if the post-French revolutionary States on a “pitch invasion” by 
the Judiciary power against Parliament did not allow the creation of a 
modern constitutional control system until the beginning of Twentieth 
century, United States judiciary review of legislation took place since 
Philadelphia Constitution was drafted: in 1788 the Federalist published 
an essay written by Alexander Hamilton on the “Judicial Department”, 
in which he affirmed that constitutional control function is provided 
to guarantee the people's general will, embodied and expressed by 
Constitution. 
A landmark decision was written in 1803 by Chief Justice John Marshall: 
Marbury v. Madison was the first U.S. Supreme Court case that applied 
the principle of judicial review, the power of federal Courts to make 
void acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution. The decision 
played a key role in making the judicial branch an equal partner of 
the Executive and Legislative branches within the developing system 
of Government: Chief Marshall affirmed that the Constitution is the 
supreme Law of the land, and established the Supreme Court as the 
final authority entitled to interpret it.
In resolving the case, the Court stated its incompetence to issue 
a writ of mandamus to require Madison to deliver the commission 
(as Judge of Peace) to Marbury, since the Court itself found that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution because it 
gave the Supreme Court more authority than it was given under the 
Constitution. Infact, the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme 
Court to “issue writs of mandamus… to persons holding office under the 
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authority of the United States, considering it as an exercise of its original 
jurisdiction. However, Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, 
stated that the exercise of original jurisdiction is allowed only in cases 
that involve “ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls… In 
all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction” 
(that is, the case must first be argued and decided by judges in the 
lower Courts). Since the dispute between Marbury and Madison did 
not involve “ambassadors, public ministers, consuls…”, the Supreme 
Court did not have the authority to exercise its original jurisdiction in 
this case. Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution were 
in conflict with each other. Thus, declaring the Constitution as a real 
“paramount law,” the Supreme Court ruled that each judge has the 
duty to interpret laws and to determine when they conflict with the 
supreme Charter: the judicial branch has the power to declare void 
laws passed by Congress in contrast with the Constitution.
In this sense, the Judicial review has been conceived essentially 
as a natural function of the judicial department: each Court may 
hear constitutional claims since there is no a specific tribunal to only 
examine the constitutionality of statutes. In order to ensure an uniform 
interpretation, the «stare decisis» principle restrains the fragmentation 
of the judicial review function and balances the lack of erga omnes 
effect of the constitutional judgments: it thus determines that the 
constitutional interpretations proposed by the Supreme Court (or by 
a hierarchically superior Court) are binding upon lower Courts. 
On the contrary, at the beginning of the Twentieth century in the 
European contest, the dispute between two German jurists, Hans 
Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, about the constitutional control system 
introduced a theoretic alternative between two different model of 
constitutional control: the control could have a jurisdictional nature 
or a pure political nature.
According to Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law” and to the hierarchical 
structure of the normative system, the constitutional control must be 
exercised by a special Court, a Judge totally external to the political 
circuit, whose independence is guaranteed by the Constitution, since he 
could not be removed from his function (centralised system). This judge 
has the task to perform a professional and technical activity applying 
legal devices and controlling the conformity of the statutes before the 
Constitution without any political, social or religious considerations.
On the contrary, since Schmitt considered the Constitution as a 
fundamental political decision, he affirmed that only the highest 
political authority could properly manage the constitutional control 
activity. In this sense, the President of the Weimar Republic was the 
only political authority able to hold properly the constitutional control 
function, since he should have been able to unify and represent the 
will of the nation.
2. After the Second War World, in reaction to the violence and to 
the breakdown of the Rule of Law, many European States rejected 
Schmitt's theorization and adopted a system of centralised judicial 
review with the provision of a specific body, independent from political 
and judiciary system, able to retain a jurisdictional monopoly over 
constitutional issues. It was based on the model proposed by Kelsen 
for the 1920 Austrian Constitution (the Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit), 
so as modified in the 1929 when the Constitution established two 
kinds of access to the Court: the review could be brought before the 
Court not only via direct access by Federal and Länder Governments, 
as it is was foreseen in the test of 1920, but also via indirect access 
(incidental review) by supreme ordinary and administrative Courts 
during a judicial proceeding.
The original model of 1920 was changed in a “hybrid» system: a 
specific constitutional Court with the exclusive jurisdiction on legislation 
could be approached not only by the Governments, but also the judges 
were entitled to approach the Constitutional Court through incidental 
review. 
In fact, the centralised system could be reproduced with several 
distinctive figures but it is undeniable that a democratic context 
represents the essential field for building up a powerful judicial 
review system. We could take a valid demonstration not just by the 
European post-war State’s building process but even by the more recent 
democratic evolution carried on by many developing Countries. In 
fact, the creation of a specialised body could ensure both a specialised 
developing expertise in the area of constitutional jurisprudence and 
the respect of the principle of separation of powers, avoiding a judicial 
politicisation. Establishing a specific Court with centralised power in 
reviewing the constitutionality of laws and Government's acts also 
provides an “insurance for the future” to the political parties, confident 
in the respect of democratic constitutional limits by the other State 
Bodies and Institutions.
An European example of the different nature of centralised model 
is certainly the French constitutional control system. In fact, due to 
its specific political and institutional events, French Republic (Fourth 
and Fifth) adopted a constitutional control sui generis, since there is a 
specific body legitimated to carry out it – the Conseil Constitutionnel 
– but its review is a priori, that is it takes place before the enactment of 
a normative act, during the parliamentary procedures. Furthermore, 
the constitutional question could be proposed by political actors such 
as the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and the Presidents of 
the two branches of Parliament; Court composition itself shows the 
political nature of the constitutional control. A few important reforms 
have mitigated the original rigidity of the constitutional guarantee 
function: the first two reforms, dated back to Seventies, introduced 
the saisine parlementaire, that allowed also sixty Deputies and sixty 
Senators to file a review to the Court, and extended the constitutionality 
parameter to the so-called bloc de constitutionnalité, that includes 
the fundamental rights. The most important reform was accomplished 
in 2008 when the Government introduced a “priority question of 
constitutionality”, allowing the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour d’Appel 
to refer constitutional issues regarding the validity of statutes to the 
Conseil after their parliamentary approval (Constitutional Law Reform 
n. 2008-724, implemented by L.O. n. 2009/153.
Other differences can be noted into the German and Spanish 
procedures of access to the constitutional Tribunal: their systems 
provide to each person – so not just a judicial authority – the right to 
file a complaint before the supreme Tribunal if there is a violation of 
her/his fundamental rights.
3. When we go in detail, a careful thought must be given to the 
design of the mechanisms for judicial enforcement. We need to take 
into account some of basic design questions that policymakers should 
have to address when constructing a constitutional court. 
These include: the Court’s membership, that is to say the composition 
and the procedures to appoint the judges; the access to the court; 
the effects of the court’s decisions, that is the judicial remedies in 
response to constitutional violations; and the relationship between 
the national constitutional Court and other supranational courts, such 
as European Courts are.
The composition of the Constitutional Courts, it represents a very 
important subject: judges should be protected from undue political 
pressure. An appointment procedure that involves many different 
political actors, rules that strictly define the causes for which a judge 
may be removed and the procedure for removal, judicial qualifications 
based on merit and expertise, and non-renewable terms for judges 
can help to foster judicial independence. 
Whereas many models foresee that all the members are nominated 
or elected by political institutions (this is the American or the German 
or the French model, and in addition in France there is no need for 
juridical qualification for the members), in other cases the choice of 
the members is subdivided among different subjects: according to 
the italian model, five judges are elected by the Parliament with a 
very high quorum, to permit a liaison of the Court with the political 
life, five are elected by the supreme Courts, ordinary, administrative, 
account, so to bring in the Court the concrete judicial experience, 
five are nominated by the President of the Republic to balance the 
other two criteria of composition and to bring into the Court different 
competences. They must be full professor of law, lawyers with 20 years 
of practice, judges of the supreme Courts.
Strictly connected are the subjects of the number of the judges 
(9 in USA, 16 in Germany, 15 in Italy), the functioning of the Court in 
sections (with the risk of losing uniformity) and of the duration of the 
charge: in the Italian model the duration is today of nine years (in the 
original test was twelve years). The length of a constitutional court 
judge’s term can affect the court’s ability to function independently. 
The charge may be renewable or non-renewable: this latter hypothesis 
seems to ensure better judge’s independence, since, on the contrary, 
his ruling could be influenced by an eventual renewable character. 
It’s not a coincidence that the Venice Commission – the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, created in 1990 – generally 
recommends “a fixed and relatively long term with no scope for re-
election” for constitutional Court judges. The possibility of a life-term 
appointment, such as is for the nine members of the Supreme Court 
of United States and for the seven judges of Australian High Court, 
could hide the risk of a non-dynamic attitude of the Court, leading to 
crystallized or static judgments.
4. As far as the access is concerned, there are two main different 
models.
Indirect access is characterised by incidental control: each judge, 
hearing a proceeding, could suspend it when he recognises a question 
of constitutionality in order to refer a preliminary request to the 
Constitutional Court, the only judge entitled to declare the possible 
provision of unconstitutionality. 
Through the indirect access the control of constitutionality is run on 
acts and statutes when they are applied in concrete cases. In the case 
of indirect access, it could be permitted to each judge or only to the 
judges of appeal or supreme to approach the Court. It is important also 
to define the concept of judge, that is to say which organ can approach 
the Court: ordinary judges, administrative and account judges, quasi 
jurisdictional organs, administrative authorities? If one desires to reach 
the result of a large extent of control, it could be better to broaden the 
number of subjects that can approach the Constitutional Court. 
Under the point of view of the attitude facing the Constitution, the 
indirect access can someway be assimilated to diffuse control (United 
States model): Constitution can be applied by judges, it is not only a 
political document, with the difference that in the centralized systems 
the judge can only suspend the proceeding, asking to the Court to say 
the last word about the conformity of a statute to the Constitution; 
whereas in the diffuse system ordinary courts are entitled to assess 
the constitutionality of any legal norm or individual act. The judges of 
such Courts are able to disapply any norm or act which they hold to be 
unconstitutional. In order to avoid incoherence and uncertainty in the 
law that might be generated by this diffuse control, the stare decisis 
principle states that the inferior Courts have to follow the superior 
Courts judgments. 
In both cases, the review proposition is necessarily related to a specific 
case, for which resolution the judge has to apply the act suspicious 
of unconstitutionality. Overall the power of the Commonwealth 
judges in centralized system are growing, being similar to the power 
of judges in diffuse system of control: it depends from the technique 
of verfassungskonforme Auslegung (interpretation conform to the 
Constitution) and of disapplication of acts.
Direct access: Constitutional courts can be approached by public entities 
such the central and regional Governments or by other constitutional 
bodies, generally when conflicts arise on power distribution among 
them. In federal, regional or decentralised States these disputes arise 
between the central Government and sub-national or local Governments, 
or among sub-national Governments themselves and concern the 
constitutionality of a law passed or acts taken by the national or a 
sub-national Governments.
We call it abstract control since the review is exercised regardless of 
the existence of a concrete dispute. The constitutionality of a statute is 
determined by contrasting the challenged legislation with a provision 
of the constitution: that is, the controversy did not arise from a concrete 
case. The constitutional question is not only an element of the case but 
is indeed the case itself. Consequently, the lawfulness of legislation 
is considered in abstract and in general, without taking into account 
the precise circumstances of any particular case.
Individual direct action is another kind of direct access to the 
constitutional Court: a private citizen might complain before the Court 
a violation of a fundamental right protected by the Charter, caused by 
legislative, administrative and judicial proceedings of public authorities. 
Most important examples are the German “Verfassungsbeschwerde” 
and the Spanish “recurso de amparo”: although these reviews have 
some different figures, they possess similar access requirements such 
as having exhausted all the applicable stages of the appeal procedures 
and the interest in the action must be personal, real and direct. In Italy 
we do not have the individual direct access, but a recent decision of the 
Cassazione – accepted by the Constitutional Court – has opened the 
way to a peculiar form of individual access, allowing the individual to 
utilize the incidental access without an individual interest to a concrete 
controversy.
In order to ensure the highest level of constitutional guarantees, it 
is clear the need to foster an even more simultaneously use and an 
interaction between the incidental and direct model both in centralised 
and diffuse systems. Strictly related to the access matter, it is the 
need to identify the subjects legally able/entitled to bring a case (via 
direct or indirect procedure) before the Constitutional Court: as seen, 
referrals could be brought by lower Courts, by different branches of 
the central or subnational Government, by citizens and by the same 
Constitutional Court. 
5. Another crucial aspect strictly related to the effectiveness of the 
constitutional control is the judgment effects: it is possible dividing 
them into two categories, as far as concern to the decisions’ subject. 
The decision passed by a constitutional Court has erga omnes effects: 
the centralized review of legislation has the power to declare void a 
statute – or its controversial provisions – and the decision is binding for 
all branches of Courts and administrative. So, Constitutional Tribunal, 
having the force to make disappear a statute from the legal order with 
its decision, acts as a “negative legislator”, as Hans Kelsen named this 
related «function». 
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On the contrary, in common law Countries with diffuse constitutional 
review, a decision passed by an ordinary Judge has binding effects only 
for the parties of the case, even if precedents issued by the Supreme 
Court are compulsory for lower Courts unless they distinguish the case 
from the precedent or overrule it with adequate reasoning.
Furthermore, decisions who concern the unconstitutionality of a 
normative act may have different temporary effects: ex nunc, when 
the invalidity takes place from the moment in which the decision is 
issued, or ex tunc, in the cases in which the act is declared void from 
the moment of its adoption, which has important consequences for 
individual cases. 
Nevertheless, there is the possibility to ‘modulate’ the effects of a 
judgment both ex tunc and ex nunc. In fact, Court could determine 
the date from which a decision of unconstitutionality produces its 
effects: for example it is possible to defer the effects in order to enable 
Legislator to intervene in the subject of the Court’s decision and thus 
avoid a legal “gap” (in Austria, deferral must not exceed 12 months).
6. Furthermore, we may mention the “Verfassungskonforme 
Auslegung”, the constitutional Court’s power to ensure constitutionality 
through a specific interpretation: in fact the Superior Judge may 
impose on all other State organs to apply a normative act only in a 
specific interpretation which the constitutional Court has found to 
be conformed to the Charter, helps to preserve normative acts even 
if one or several unconstitutional interpretations would be possible. 
But if the ordinary or administrative Judges do not follow the Court’s 
interpretations, these are ineffective. In order to overcome the problem 
of non-application of the constitutional Court’s decision, the Italian 
Constitutional Court has developed the concept of “diritto vivente”. 
The constitutional Judge interprets the contested legal provision both 
as it is “usually” interpreted by ordinary Courts (Corte di Cassazione 
and Consiglio di Stato) and in the “living meaning”, and waives to 
propose its own constitutional interpretation.
7. If the greater guarantee offered by a subjective and centralised 
control based on the Kelsenian model has fostered the almost exclusive 
implementation of the Judicial review entrusted to an authority which is 
substantially unrelated or neutral to the political circuit, it is nevertheless 
incorrect to exclude the political configuration theorized by Schmitt 
from the network of the current debate.  
In fact, in the current supranational dimension of the European 
jurisdiction, the aforementioned juxtaposition seems to have been 
transposed, in the relation between art. 7 of the EU Treaty – set to 
protect its foundational values (the democratic principle and the 
fundamental human Rights ) – and the European Court of Justice, 
having the jurisdiction on the legality of the acts adopted in accordance 
with the aforementioned enacting term (as well as art. 2 UET) and the 
procedures provided for in art. 269 UET. 
The European Court effectively operates in the capacity of constitutional 
Jurisdiction: it ensures the observance of the Union law in the interpretation 
and enactment of the Treaty, through the provision of a mechanism of 
preliminary ruling procedure actioned by a national Court, should it 
detect an antinomy between a Community provision and an internal 
regulation. It also passes judgment on the conflicts of competence 
between Community institutions and member States, operating an 
evaluation of the allocation of powers.  
Precisely the EU Jurisdiction’s ever more incisive and penetrating 
activity (on the part of the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights) has contributed to the construction of the 
system of fundamental rights and values common at European level, 
perfectly in line with the essence of the fundamental Charters which 
represent a balanced set of values and principles on which the social 
and institutional life of a State is based.  
This matter is part of a wider debate on the relationship between 
national and international legal systems: in order to establish the 
relations among the national ordinary Courts and the Constitutional 
one, as well as among these and the international and supranational 
Courts, it is required, first of all, having a fixed and stable system that 
provides the procedure for ensure the application of international Law 
into the domestic one. In this sense, it is needed taking into account 
the two main ways that allow the interaction between the systems: 
on the one hand the monistic approach, on the other the dualistic 
theory. According to the former approach, the international Law does 
not need to be translated into national Law since they represents a 
unified legal system, with a hierarchical relation each other. In this sense, 
the act of ratifying an international Treaty immediately incorporates 
the international Law into domestic system. On the contrary, since 
the second approach considers the international and domestic legal 
orders as two separated, distinct sets of legal systems, it sustains a non-
direct application of the international Legislation into the national Law 
but it is required a “translation” of the first legal provisions through 
a specific internal law.
As far as concern to direct application of European Law into the Italian 
legislation system, we need underline the different approach held by 
national institutions towards the European Law 'stricto sensu', and the 
ECHR legislation. If the Italian Constitutional Court – as well as the other 
national Constitutional Courts and as the ECJ required – affirmed the 
disapplication of the domestic Law in contrast with the European one, 
it holds a different attitude towards Human Rights Court's normative. 
In fact, main doctrine stated that an internal Law in contrast with ECHR 
is unconstitutional: with two important decisions – n. 348 and 349 
passed in 2007 – the Italian constitutional Court decreed the specific 
position held by ECHR into the internal Law system, considered it such 
as an external/third constitutional parameter (well-known as “norma 
interposta”). Nevertheless, we have to mention a minority doctrine 
that sustains the same procedure provided for the European general 
Law, that is the disapplication of domestic normative that diverges 
from Communitarian one.
8. The European Court of Justice, in its function of interpreting and 
guaranteeing the respect and application of the Treaties, has gradually 
expanded its range of action, operating a “field invasion” with regard 
to the jurisdiction on the fundamental rights such as carried out by 
ECHR and national Court.
Therefore, the need to regulate the relations between the two main 
European Courts has become clear, at least until the European Union 
does not subscribe the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
well as set up by Article 6, par. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
In this sense, the «Equivalence principle» states the exclusion of 
the ECHR review over any acts of the European Union, in case they 
provide an “equivalent” protection over fundamental rights such as 
Convention does. This principle is partially codified into art. 52, par. 
3 ECHR. However, this exclusion shows an essential primacy of ECHR 
provisions respect to the European law, since this has to be “equivalent” 
to the first mentioned system. 
Furthermore, this progressive European jurisdiction enlargement 
over fundamental rights claims and over economic rights seems to 
produce/involve a gradual restraint of the national constitutional Courts 
jurisdiction over the same matter.
Relevant to this aspect, the relation between the Italian jurisdiction 
and the other two European Courts. The dialogue established among 
national ordinary Courts and European Courts is much more direct 
and deeper: it has been encouraged by the development of an 
European common model for protecting and fostering fundamental 
rights and a common heritage of constitutional values. These factors 
have involved in a reduction of the role of the Constitutional judge 
about the protection of citizen rights: it exercises mainly is jurisdiction 
over distribution powers conflicts, among constitutional bodies as 
well as between central Government and subnational governments. 
This “juridical trend” is confirmed by the decrease in the number of 
incidental reviews brought before the Constitutional Court and by the 
simultaneous increase of the constitutional questions that concern 
power conflicts among constitutional bodies. This trend – still to be 
deeply analyzed – may have relevant consequences on the national 
and European institutions. 
Б. Каравита ди Торитто: Конституциялық бақылау механизмдерінің 
қызметі етуі: еуропалық тәжірибе негізіндегі кейбір ойлар .
Мақалада XIX ғ. басынан бастап осы уақытқа дейінгі конституциялық 
бақылаудың эволюциясына талдау жасалған. Конституциялық бақылаудың 
негізгі моделі, оның сан алуан қызметі, осы құқықтық институттар-
ды қалыптастыру жолдары мен олардың саралау ерекшеліктері 
қарастырылады. Конституциялық бақылауда Еуропалық Соттың және 
адам құқықтары туралы Еуропалық соттың артып отырған рөлі атап 
өтіледі. 
Осыған байланысты азаматтардың құқығын қорғау ісінде бірқатар 
еуропа елдерінің конституциялық бақылау органдарының рөлінің 
біртіндеп төмендеу үрдісі және олардың қызметінің дау-дамайларды 
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НОВыЕ КНиги
шешу саласына белгілі бір араласуы мен мемлекеттік органдар ара-
сында, атап айтқанда, орталық үкімет пен жергілікті билік органда-
ры арасында уәкілеттіктерді бөлу баяндалады. 
Түйінді сөз: құқық, конституция, мемлекет, конституциялық бақылау 
органдары, конституциялық сот, конституциялық кеңес, Еуропалық 
Сот, адам құқықтары туралы Еуропалық сот, ұлттық және халықаралық 
соттардың диалогы, адам құқықтары. 
Б. Каравита ди Торитто: функционирование механизмов кон-
ституционного контроля: некоторые размышления на основе 
европейского опыта. 
В статье дан анализ эволюции конституционного контроля от на-
чала XIX в. до настоящего времени. Рассмотрены основные модели 
конституционного контроля, его разнообразные функции, пути фор-
мирования и квалификационные особенности данных правовых ин-
ститутов. Отмечена возрастающая роль в конституционном контро-
ле Европейского Суда и Европейского суда по правам человека. 
В связи с этим констатируется юридическая тенденция постепен-
ного снижения роли органов конституционного контроля некото-
рых европейских стран в деле защиты прав граждан и определен-
ное смещение их деятельности в сферу разрешения конфликтов и 
распределения полномочий между государственными органами, в 
частности, между центральным правительством и местными орга-
нами власти.
Ключевые слова: право, конституция, государство, органы консти-
туционного контроля, конституционный суд, конституционный со-
вет, Европейский Суд, Европейский суд по правам человека, диалог 
национальных и международных судов, права человека.
